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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This opinion addresses a number of sentencing issues 
presented by the consolidated appeal of three defendants: 
Dennis Nathan, who pled guilty to importing goods into the 
United States that were not marked with the country of 
origin in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 545; Victor Lander, who 
pled guilty to unlawfully introducing merchandise into the 
United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 542; and 
Electrodyne Systems Corporation, which pled guilty to 
violating the Arms Control Export Act, 22 U.S.C.S 2778, 
and making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1001. Only two of the issues are of general interest and 
precedential value. The first involves the proper definition of 
a "stipulation" under U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2, the presence of 
which may take a sentence to a higher guideline level. We 
conclude that statements made during the factual basis 
portion of the plea colloquy after the plea agreement has 
been made are not stipulations for the purpose of section 
1B1.2, as such statements cannot be said to be part of a 
plea agreement. Because the District Court relied on such 
non-cognizable statements in finding that Nathan and 
Lander had stipulated to the greater offense of fraud, we 
will reverse the judgment to the extent that it relied on the 
fraud guidelines in sentencing the defendants. 
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The second question concerns whether the president of a 
defense contracting company occupies a position of trust 
with regard to the government, an issue we must resolve to 
decide whether the District Court correctly applied the 
adjustment for the abuse of a position of trust. We 
conclude that the District Court's findings that Nathan held 
a position of trust, and that he breached that trust, are 
supported by the record and are legally correct. We will 
therefore affirm the District Court's decision to increase 
Nathan's base offense level two points on this ground. For 
these reasons and the reasons that follow in our discussion 
of the other more fact-bound issues before us, we will 
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the District 
Court so that each defendant can be resentenced. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
A. The Charges and the Pleas 
 
Electrodyne Systems Corporation, a defense contracting 
company, specialized in providing military components to 
the United States government. Nathan was Electrodyne's 
president and vice-president. Lander was its director of 
marketing. Between November 1989 and March 1994, 
Electrodyne entered into six contracts to provide United 
States government agencies and the United States 
military--including the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration ("NASA") and the United States Air 
Force--with electronic components to be used in research, 
communications, radar, and weapons systems. Each 
contract required Electrodyne to comply with the Buy 
American Act, 41 U.S.C. S 10a-10d (1988), and in each 
contract Nathan (on Electrodyne's behalf) represented that 
Electrodyne (a) intended to manufacture the components in 
the United States; (b) would not use foreign components; 
and (c) would not use offshore manufacturing sites. 
 
Despite their contractual and statutory obligations, 
Nathan and Electrodyne entered into agreements with 
foreign companies in Russia and the Ukraine to build the 
components specified in the contracts. In so agreeing, 
Nathan disclosed to the foreign manufacturers the 
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drawings, specifications, and technology of the contracted- 
for components. To conceal this plan, Nathan instructed 
Electrodyne's employees not to disclose the use of foreign 
components, instructed the foreign manufacturers not to 
mark the components with the country of manufacture, 
and directed his own employees to mark the components to 
make it appear as if they had been manufactured in the 
United States. Nathan failed to disclose these foreign 
contracts to the government and failed to register with the 
State Department as a manufacturer or exporter of defense 
articles. 
 
A federal grand jury returned a thirteen-count indictment 
charging Electrodyne, Nathan, and Lander with, inter alia, 
violating the Arms Export Control Act ("AECA") and the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR"), making 
false or fraudulent claims, and smuggling goods into the 
United States. A few months later, pursuant to written plea 
agreements, all three defendants pled guilty to various 
parts of the indictment. Electrodyne pled guilty to exporting 
defense-related items in violation of the AECA and to 
making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 1001. 
Nathan pled guilty to Count 12 of the indictment, which 
alleged that he had illegally imported goods into the United 
States because he failed to mark the items with the country 
of origin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 545. Lander pled guilty 
to a one-count information alleging unlawful introduction of 
merchandise into the commerce of the United States in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 542. 
 
As part of their plea agreements, Nathan and Lander and 
the government drafted a schedule of stipulations. They 
stipulated that the applicable sentencing guideline was the 
smuggling guideline, which is found at section 2T3.1,1 and 
that the government would not seek an upward departure 
for either defendant. They also stipulated that Nathan's and 
Lander's actions did not threaten national security. In 
Nathan's plea agreement, the government stated that it did 
not suffer a tax loss as a result of Nathan's conduct. 
Finally, each of Nathan's and Lander's agreements recited 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Appendix A of the U.S.S.G. lists S 2T3.1 as the applicable guideline 
section for violations of 18 U.S.C. SS 542 and 545. 
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that the schedule attached to the agreement contained all 
of their stipulations and that any changes to the agreement 
had to be in writing and signed by both the defendant and 
the government. 
 
At the plea hearing for Nathan and Lander, the District 
Court questioned them on their understanding of the 
agreement, and then asked each of them to provide a 
factual basis for the plea, using questions contained in a 
government plea memorandum. During this questioning, 
Nathan admitted that, when he entered into a contract with 
the Naval Research Laboratory ("NRL") to provide it with 
amplifiers, he knew that Lander had ordered the amplifiers 
from a Ukrainian company. He also admitted that he had 
instructed Electrodyne's employees to obscure markings 
indicating foreign manufacturing and to affix Electrodyne 
labels to the amplifiers in an effort to deceive the NRL. 
Lander in turn conceded that Electrodyne had contracted 
with the Ukrainian company, that he had instructed the 
Ukrainian manufacturer not to mark the components in a 
way that indicated where they were made, and that he had 
informed the manufacturer that Electrodyne would relabel 
all future shipments of amplifiers to indicate that the 
amplifiers were made in the United States. Lander admitted 
that he knowingly assisted Electrodyne in deceiving the 
United States government. 
 
B. The Sentencing Proceedings 
 
1. The Factual Record 
 
Prior to sentencing, Nathan submitted to the Court a 
report from Retired Rear Admiral Lawrence Layman of the 
United States Navy stating that no American troops had 
been put in danger by Nathan's disclosure of information. 
In addition, the government researched whether the 
defendants had divulged any sensitive information and 
concluded: (i) that they had not revealed sensitive 
information; (ii) that all relevant information was already in 
the public domain; and (iii) that the parts supplied by the 
defendants to the government agencies were not defective. 
In its sentencing memorandum, the government: (1) 
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represented that all affected government agencies approved 
of the plea agreement; (2) conceded that the defendants had 
taken action to prevent classified material from being 
disclosed; and (3) noted that some of the components 
imported by the defendants actually represented aflow of 
technology into, rather than out of, the United States. 
 
Also prior to sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office 
submitted a proposed Presentence Investigation Report 
("PSI"). The PSI recommended that Nathan and Lander be 
sentenced under the fraud guidelines (section 2F1.1), 
rather than the smuggling guidelines (section 2T3.1). The 
PSI acknowledged that, under section 1B1.2, the more 
severe fraud guidelines would in normal circumstances 
apply only if Nathan and Lander stipulated to the greater 
offense of fraud, but opined that their statements during 
the District Court's "factual basis" inquiry at the plea 
hearing were stipulations sufficient to establish fraud 
offenses. The PSI also suggested that the case was 
"atypical" under Appendix A of the Guidelines, such that 
the fraud guidelines might at all events apply. Both 
Nathan's and Lander's counsel objected to a number of 
paragraphs in the PSI. In addition, Lander informed the 
Court that he intended to move for a downward departure 
at sentencing based upon his status as a political refugee. 
 
The Probation Office issued a revised PSI. The PSI 
continued to recommend that the fraud guidelines should 
apply, but now implicitly conceded that the defendant's 
verbal admissions were not stipulations. For example, the 
PSI for Lander stated, "Although not a stipulation, the 
probation office posits that the defendant's verbal 
admissions, under oath and on the record, are more 
persuasive or, at least, as binding as a stipulation to a 
more serious offense." Lander PSI P148 (emphasis added). 
An addendum to Nathan's revised PSI argued that, if the 
court applied section 2T3.1 rather than section 2F1.1, 
Nathan could be subject to an upward departure under 
section 5K2.0 on the ground that the smuggling guidelines 
inadequately captured the seriousness of Nathan's offense. 
 
The District Court sentenced Electrodyne to a five year 
term of probation, $1,000,000 in fines, and restitution to 
three government agencies, part in cash and part in kind. 
 
                                7 
  
Electrodyne filed a timely notice of appeal from the 
judgment on the ground that the corporation lacked the 
ability to pay such fines. In United States v. Electrodyne 
Systems Corp., 147 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 1998) (Electrodyne I), 
we vacated the $1,000,000 fine and remanded with 
instructions to the District Court to make more detailed 
findings on the company's ability to pay. 
 
2. The Present Sentences 
 
At sentencing for Nathan and Lander, both the 
government and the defendants' attorneys asked the Court 
to sentence them in accordance with their plea agreements, 
but the Court declined to do so. It offered two bases for the 
sentences it was about to impose. First, it found that the 
parties had stipulated to a more serious offense under 
section 1B1.2 based on Nathan's and Lander's responses to 
the questions posed at the plea colloquy. The Court deemed 
the facts that came out at the colloquy to be "stipulations" 
to fraud offenses, rendering the fraud guidelines applicable. 
Second, the Court stated that even if it sentenced the 
defendants under the smuggling guidelines, it would reach 
the same ultimate sentence by relying on Application Note 
2 of section 2T3.1 and section 5K2.0. 
 
Application Note 2 provides that an upward departure 
may be warranted where the items for which the defendant 
evaded paying import duties were items whose import was 
prohibited or limited, since the duties evaded may not 
adequately reflect the harm to society. The Court 
determined that the duties evaded by Nathan and Lander 
did not adequately reflect the harm to society and that the 
dismissed counts of the indictment more accurately 
measured that harm. Finding that Nathan and Lander had 
shared with the Ukraine and Russia information that was 
"not generally known," see United States v. Electrodyne Sys. 
Corp., 28 F. Supp. 2d 213, 268 (D.N.J. 1998) (Electrodyne 
II), the Court repeatedly stated that the defendants' conduct 
threatened national security and the safety of United States 
troops, see, e.g. id. at 262-63, 268, 269, 270. On this basis, 
the Court departed upward nine levels from section 2T3.1's 
base offense level of four. The Court also determined that 
Nathan was in a position of trust vis-a-vis the government 
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because he received military data, and that he abused this 
trust by sharing the information with foreign 
manufacturers. It therefore added two points to his offense 
level in accordance with section 3B1.3. We now describe 
the actual sentences: first Nathan, then Lander, then 
Electrodyne. 
 
The District Court concluded that Nathan's base offense 
level under the fraud guidelines was six; that the loss was 
between $350,000 and $500,000 and thus, in accordance 
with the table set out in section 2F1.1(b)(1), Nathan 
warranted a nine-level increase of his base offense level; 
that he deserved a two-level increase for more than minimal 
planning and a four-level increase under section 3B1.1(a) 
for his role as the leader or organizer of an extensive 
criminal activity; and that he should receive a three-point 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility. This calculation 
led to a total offense level of eighteen, and with a criminal 
history category of I, the Guideline imprisonment range is 
27-33 months. The District Court imposed a thirty-month 
sentence. 
 
The Court calculated an alternative sentence for Nathan 
as follows, using the smuggling guidelines: a base offense 
level of four; an increase of two points for use of 
sophisticated means; an increase of four points for his role 
in the offense; an increase of two points for abuse of trust; 
a nine-level upward departure for the atypical nature of the 
offense (based on the national security threats resulting 
from the offense, the violations of the Buy American Act 
and the AECA, and the fraud that the defendants 
committed); and a three-point reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility. The total offense level in the wake of these 
calculations is also eighteen. As noted above, with a 
criminal history category of I, the Guidelines imprisonment 
range is 27-33 months; the thirty-month sentence imposed 
was mid-range. 
 
The Court determined that Lander's offense level under 
the fraud guidelines was fourteen: his base offense level 
was six; the loss was between $350,000 and $500,000, 
which, under section 2F1.1(b)(1), calls for a nine-level 
increase of his base offense level; he deserved a two-level 
increase for more than minimal planning; and he should 
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receive a three-point reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility. With a criminal history category of I, the 
Guideline imprisonment range was therefore 15-21 months. 
The Court sentenced Lander to eighteen months in prison, 
which was in the middle of that range. 
 
As it did with Nathan, the Court sentenced Lander in the 
alternative under the smuggling guidelines: it calculated a 
base offense level of four; an increase of two points for use 
of sophisticated means; an increase of four points for his 
role in the offense; a nine-level upward departure for the 
atypical nature of the offense (based on the security threats 
seen to have resulted from the offense, the violations of the 
Buy American Act and the AECA, and the fraud that the 
defendants committed); and a three-point reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility, for a total offense level of 
thirteen. The applicable imprisonment range under the 
smuggling guideline was 12-18 months, so the Court's 
eighteen-month sentence was at the very top of that range. 
 
Before re-sentencing, Electrodyne argued--and the 
government agreed--that the appropriate loss amount was 
$189,255.65. Nevertheless, the District Court, referencing 
the PSI's statement that Electrodyne had stipulated to 
paying $369,105.70 in restitution, concluded that the 
restitution amount served as an appropriate measure of 
loss. The District Court calculated that the restitution 
broke down as follows: $170,660 was for investigation and 
reprocurement costs associated with two Air Force 
contracts; $139,200 reflected the value of a settlement 
agreement between the Air Force and Electrodyne relating 
to one of the contracts, because the settlement agreement 
had been canceled as a result of the plea agreement; $2000 
was to go to the Naval Research Lab ("NRL"); and either (a) 
$14,595.65 plus three converters or (b) $42,650.05 plus 
one converter was to go to NASA.2 The Court also ordered 
Electrodyne to pay $500,000 in fines. 
 
All three defendants appeal from the District Court's 
sentencing determinations. We have jurisdiction under 28 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court stated that the total amount of restitution could be 
paid by the defendants collectively. Electrodyne appears to have 
assumed full responsibility for paying restitution. 
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U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a). Nathan and Lander 
argue that the District Court erred in applying the fraud 
guidelines since, they contend, their factual basis 
statements did not constitute a stipulation to the greater 
offense of fraud. Second, assuming that the District Court 
did err in using the fraud guidelines, they submit that the 
Court abused its discretion in departing upward under the 
smuggling guidelines and section 5K2.0. Nathan contests 
the District Court's conclusion that he abused a position of 
trust. Lander objects to the Court's decision not to depart 
downward based on his status as a political refugee. 
Electrodyne argues that the District Court overvalued the 
loss the company caused to the government and that the 
Court erred in concluding that Electrodyne had the current 
or future ability to pay any amount over $140,000. Each 
defendant argues that, on remand, we should assign the 
case to a different judge. 
 
II. Nathan and Lander 
 
A. Sentencing Under Section 2F1.1 (Fraud Guidelines): 
Was There a "Stipulation"? 
 
A court must sentence a defendant under the guideline 
most applicable to the offense of conviction (here, 
smuggling) unless: (1) as explained in Appendix A of the 
Guidelines, the case is an "atypical" case such that the 
guideline section indicated for the statute of conviction is 
inappropriate for the particular conduct involved; or (2) 
under U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2(a), the parties stipulated to a more 
serious offense in a written or oral plea agreement. 
 
The relevant smuggling guideline's introductory 
commentary states: "This Subpart deals with violations of 
18 U.S.C. SS 496, 541-45, 547, 548 . . . and is designed to 
address violations involving revenue collection or trade 
regulation." The text of the section 2T3.1 guideline states: 
 
       (a) Base Offense Level: 
 
       (1) The level from S2T4.1 (Tax Table) corresponding to 
       the tax loss, if the tax loss exceeded $1,000; or 
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       (2) 5, if the tax loss exceeded $100 but did not exceed 
       $1,000; or 
 
       (3) 4, if the tax loss did not exceed $100. 
 
       For purposes of this guideline, the "tax loss" is the 
       amount of the duty. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2T3.1. While the District Court expressly 
determined that this case was not "atypical" in the context 
of Appendix A, see Electrodyne II, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 244- 
45, it did find that Nathan's and Lander's answers to the 
factual basis questions were stipulations to fraud (which 
the Guidelines treat more seriously than smuggling) and 
thus that section 2F1.1 was the proper sentencing 
guideline. 
 
We must perforce determine whether the District Court 
erred as a matter of law by treating Nathan's and Lander's 
oral statements at the factual basis hearing as 
"stipulations," an issue over which we have plenary review. 
See United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 
1999). This Court has not yet determined what constitutes 
a stipulation for the purpose of U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2(a). If the 
statements on which the District Court based itsfinding of 
fraud were not stipulations, then it erred in applying the 
fraud guidelines rather than the smuggling guidelines. 
 
Nathan and Lander contend that: (i) the PSI conceded 
that their statements at the hearing were not stipulations; 
(ii) the plea agreement and its attendant stipulations 
contained a "four corners" provision that all stipulations 
between the parties were contained therein and could only 
be modified in writing; and (iii) they never signed the plea 
memorandum from which the government asked its 
questions at the factual basis colloquy. The government 
does not argue that the District Court was correct to deem 
Nathan's and Lander's responses "stipulations"; in fact, it 
argues only that, since the District Court properly 
sentenced Nathan under section 2T3.1, we need not resolve 
this issue. However, the Court clearly relied on the fraud 
guidelines in sentencing Nathan. See Electrodyne II, 28 F. 
Supp. 2d at 251 ("Accordingly, the Individual Defendants 
stipulated to the more serious offense of fraud and Section 
2F1.1 is the applicable Guideline."). We therefore must 
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determine the meaning of "stipulation" in the section 
1B1.2(a) context. 
 
The Supreme Court was presented with (but did not 
decide) the meaning of "stipulation" in Braxton v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 344 (1991). The version of section 1B1.2 
that existed in 1991 stated: 
 
       Provided, however, in the case of conviction by plea of 
       guilty . . . containing a stipulation that specifically 
       establishes a more serious offense than the offense of 
       conviction, [the court should] determine the offense 
       guideline section . . . most applicable to the stipulated 
       offense. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2(a) (emphasis added). In Braxton, the 
defendant pled guilty to assault but not to attempted 
murder, though there was no formal plea agreement. 
Nevertheless, he agreed with the version of the facts 
proffered by the government at the plea hearing, which 
facts included a basis for an attempted murder charge. The 
district court, which sentenced him under the attempted 
murder guidelines, found--and the court of appeals 
agreed--that the defendant had stipulated to the more 
serious charge. Before the Supreme Court, the defendant 
argued that a stipulation had to be part of a formal plea 
agreement. The Court acknowledged a circuit split on the 
meaning of "stipulation" but declined to resolve the 
question, since the Sentencing Commission had just 
requested public comment on whether section 1B1.2(a) 
should be "amended to provide expressly that such a 
stipulation must be as part of a formal plea agreement." 
See Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348 (quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 1891 
(1991)). 
 
In 1991, the Sentencing Commission amended section 
1B1.2(a) to read: 
 
       [A court must determine] the offense guideline section 
       . . . most applicable to the offense of conviction. . . . 
       Provided, however, in the case of a plea agreement 
       (written or made orally on the record) containing a 
       stipulation that specifically establishes a more serious 
       offense than the offense of conviction, [the court must] 
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       determine the offense guideline section . . . most 
       applicable to the stipulated offense. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2(a) (emphasis added); U.S.S.G. App. C, 
amend. 434. Application Note 1 to this section provides: 
 
       Where a stipulation . . . made between the parties on 
       the record during a plea proceeding specifically 
       establishes facts that prove a more serious offense or 
       offenses than the offense or offenses of conviction, the 
       court is to apply the guideline most applicable to the 
       more serious offense or offenses established. 
 
Id. at application note 1. 
 
Section 6B1.4 of the Guidelines, which governs 
stipulations, states, "A plea agreement may be accompanied 
by a written stipulation of facts relevant to sentencing." See 
id. S 6B1.4(a) (emphasis added). The Commentary to this 
section notes that 
 
       [b]ecause of the importance of the stipulations and the 
       potential complexity of the factors that can affect the 
       determination of sentences, stipulations ordinarily 
       should be in writing. However, exceptions to this 
       practice may be allowed by local rule. The Commission 
       intends to pay particular attention to this aspect of the 
       plea agreement procedure as experience under the 
       guidelines develops. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Though the Commission has not 
foreclosed the possibility that stipulations may be oral, it 
clearly favors written stipulations over oral ones. 3 
 
While neither the language of section 1B1.2(a) itself nor 
the language of section 6B1.4 is dispositive of whether 
Nathan's and Lander's statements during the factual basis 
were stipulations, section 1B1.2(a)'s reference to a 
stipulation as something contained within the plea 
agreement strongly suggests that statements made in 
factual basis colloquies are not stipulations. Section 
1B1.2(a) speaks of stipulations as part of a plea agreement. 
A scrupulous reading of section 1B1.2(a), which will require 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note that the District Court for the District of New Jersey has not 
established local rules providing for oral stipulations. 
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that all of the defendant's stipulations be either part of or 
annexed to his plea agreement, would provide notice to the 
defendant as to exactly what facts underlying his offense he 
is agreeing to and will ensure that the defendant receives 
the benefit of his bargain. In addition, though section 1B1.2 
itself provides for oral plea agreements and, presumably, 
oral stipulations contained therein, the Guidelines favor 
written stipulations over oral ones. The Application Note 
also suggests that we should give a common sense reading 
to "stipulation," such that it refers to situations in which 
both parties specifically and explicitly agree, on the record, 
to the truth of the relevant facts. We thus think the 
language of the Guidelines compels the conclusion that 
Nathan's and Lander's statements should not be construed 
as stipulations. 
 
We find support for our position in the caselaw, 
especially in United States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245 (2d 
Cir. 1988). Guerrero held that a stipulation between the 
government and defense counsel, entered into to obviate 
fact-finding at a sentencing hearing, did not trigger the 
proviso of section 1B1.2(a). The court explained that section 
1B1.2(a) 
 
       applies only to a stipulation contained in a plea of 
       guilty or nolo contendere, not to a stipulation 
       negotiated after a plea in connection with sentencing. 
       Prior to plea, the prosecution has the opportunity to 
       condition its willingness to accept a plea to less than 
       all counts of an indictment on the defendant's 
       willingness to stipulate that he committed crimes in 
       addition to those to which he is pleading guilty. In 
       offering to reduce the defendant's maximum exposure 
       to the penalties in the conviction counts, the 
       prosecution is entitled to extract an admission of facts 
       that may justify a substantial sentence within that 
       maximum. But once the Government agrees to a plea 
       bargain without extracting such an admission, facts 
       admitted by the defendant to shorten or obviate a 
       sentencing hearing do not establish a "stipulated 
       offense" within the meaning of section 1B1.2(a). 
 
Id. at 248; see also United States v. Gardner, 940 F.2d 587, 
591 (10th Cir. 1991) (requiring a "knowing agreement by 
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the defendant, as part of a plea bargain, that facts 
supporting a more serious offense occurred and could be 
presented to the court" for the court to apply section 
1B1.2(a)); United States v. McCall, 915 F.2d 811, 816 n.4 
(2d Cir. 1990) (requiring that any stipulation be part of the 
plea agreement itself); United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 
1558, 1561 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining that once the 
government agrees to a plea bargain without extracting an 
admission, facts admitted by the defendant can be 
considered only as relevant conduct in determining the 
appropriate guideline range, not as stipulations under 
section 1B1.2(a)). But see United States v. Loos, 165 F.3d 
504, 508 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the objective 
behind section 1B1.2(a) is best achieved by reading 
"stipulation" to mean any acknowledgment by the 
defendant that he committed the acts that justify use of the 
more serious guideline), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1090 
(1999); United States v. Domino, 62 F.3d 716, 722 (5th Cir. 
1995) (assuming that the factual resume--the equivalent of 
the "factual basis" in this case--can contain stipulations). 
 
In this case, where the parties drafted and agreed to a 
document that explicitly contained all of the relevant 
stipulations between them, it is clear that their"deal" 
encompassed only those stipulations contained in that 
document. Though it is true that Nathan, Lander, and their 
attorneys had, in advance, read the plea memorandum 
from which the government asked its questions at the 
factual basis, see Electrodyne II, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 228 
n.20 & 231 n.22, the defendants never signed it or in any 
other way assented to it. Here the facts at issue came out 
at the plea hearing itself while the judge was deciding 
whether to accept the plea, rather than in negotiations after 
the plea had been accepted, as in Guerrero. We nevertheless 
conclude that the plea agreements between the government 
and the defendants were complete before the factual basis 
hearing, and that the facts admitted in the factual basis 
hearing were in no way part of the government's "deal" with 
Nathan and Lander. We also think it significant that the 
government did not attempt to defend the District Court's 
determination that Nathan's and Lander's comments were 
stipulations. 
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In sum, we conclude that the text of section 1B1.2(a), 
examined especially in light of the changes the Commission 
made from the earlier version of that section, indicates that 
a statement is a "stipulation" only if: (i) it is part of a 
defendant's written plea agreement; (ii) it is explicitly 
annexed thereto; or (iii) both the government and the 
defendant explicitly agree at a factual basis hearing that 
the facts being put on the record are stipulations that 
might subject a defendant to the provisions of section 
1B1.2(a). Nathan's and Lander's statements at the factual 
basis hearing do not meet this definition of "stipulation," 
and we conclude that the District Court erred infinding 
otherwise. 
 
Because the District Court rejected the only other ground 
on which it could have relied to invoke the fraud guidelines 
when it concluded that the defendants' case was not 
atypical under Appendix A of the Guidelines, we hold that 
the District Court erred in applying the fraud guidelines in 
sentencing Nathan and Lander. In light of this, we examine 
whether he correctly sentenced Nathan and Lander in the 
alternative using the smuggling guidelines. 
 
B. Sentencing Under Section 2T3.1 (Smuggling Guidelines) 
 
As noted above, after sentencing Nathan and Lander 
under the fraud guidelines, the District Court held that 
even if the defendants did not stipulate to fraud, it would 
have reached the same sentence had it used the smuggling 
guidelines, which were the guidelines to which the 
defendants had stipulated. See Electrodyne II , 28 F. Supp. 
2d at 272. Because a court may properly sentence in the 
alternative, we must analyze the propriety of the sentence 
under section 2T3.1. See United States v. Bermingham, 855 
F.2d 925, 934-35 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that a court may 
still affirm a sentence despite an alleged error in the 
application of the Guidelines when it is clear that the 
sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence 
under the alternative Guidelines scheme proposed); see 
also United States v. Barnes, No. 98-50418, 1999 WL 
459223 (9th Cir. June 30, 1999) (reviewing each of two 
alternative Guidelines grounds on which District Court 
sentenced defendant); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 
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F.2d 542 (11th Cir. 1990) (considering both of District 
Court's alternative grounds for sentencing and reversing on 
both grounds). 
 
Having invoked the smuggling guidelines, the District 
Court found that an upward departure under section 5K2.0 
was appropriate based on the "seriousness of the offenses." 
Electrodyne II, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 266. The Court relied on 
Application Note 2 to section 2T3.1, which states: 
 
       Particular attention should be given to those items for 
       which entry is prohibited, limited, or restricted. 
       Especially when such items are harmful or protective 
       quotas are in effect, the duties evaded on such items 
       may not adequately reflect the harm to society or 
       protected industries resulting from their importation. 
       In such instances, an upward departure may be 
       warranted. 
 
Id. The Court concluded that the duties evaded by the 
defendants did not adequately measure the harm they 
caused. Specifically, the Court found that four aspects of 
the defendants' conduct rendered this case an "atypical" 
smuggling case: the fact that the defendants defrauded the 
government for their own financial gain; the fact that the 
actions of the defendants compromised and may in the 
future compromise the national security of the United 
States; the fact that they violated the AECA; and the fact 
that they violated the Buy American Act, which permitted 
them to gain an unfair financial advantage over those 
companies that complied with the statute. The Court 
appears to have used the fraud guidelines as a framework 
to help it determine how large an upward departure to 
impose, since it reached a total offense level of 18 under the 
smuggling guidelines, just as it did under the fraud 
guidelines. 
 
Nathan and Lander object to the upward departure for 
several reasons. First, the Court earlier had found that this 
case was not atypical under section 2T3.1, and so should 
not have departed upwards in light of the Commentary to 
section 5K2.0, which requires that a case be "sufficiently 
atypical" before a court may depart upward. Second, the 
Court's four bases for an upward departure--that Nathan 
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and Lander defrauded the government for their own 
financial gain, that they violated the BAA, that they violated 
the AECA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and 
most importantly that their actions threatened the 
operational integrity of the United States military--were 
either not factually supported by the record or could not be 
said to render their offense atypical. Third, even if one of 
the four bases was a proper basis on which to upwardly 
depart, they argue that we must remand for resentencing 
under Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98-99 (1996), 
since the other bases were improper. 
 
The government responds that the Court properly relied 
on Application Note 2 to section 2T3.1 to conclude that acts 
like those committed by the defendant warranted an 
upward departure. The government stresses that the 
components at issue here were, contrary to the defendants' 
assertions, "prohibited, limited, or restricted" under 19 
U.S.C. S 1304(d), which says that items that do not bear 
proper markings may not be brought into United States 
commerce. It submits that, because of the prohibited 
nature of the components, Application Note 2 suggests that 
an upward departure may be warranted. Nevertheless, the 
government also acknowledges that it never alleged that the 
defendants' actions posed any threat to national security. 
 
Section 5K2.0 states: 
 
       Under 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b), the sentencing court may 
       impose a sentence outside the range established by the 
       applicable guidelines, if the court finds that "there 
       exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 
       kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
       consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
       formulating the guidelines that should result in a 
       sentence different from that described." 
 
Id. The Commentary to this section requires that the case 
be "sufficiently atypical" before a departure is warranted. As 
a preliminary matter, we note an anomaly in this case. In 
discussing whether the case was sufficiently atypical to 
take it out of the smuggling guidelines under the terms of 
Appendix A, the Court found that, because the smuggling 
guidelines intended to target offenses involving revenue 
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collection or trade regulation, Nathan's case was not atypical.4 
It stated, "Accordingly, the instant matter is not atypical as 
to the Guideline section ordinarily applicable to the offense 
of conviction." Electrodyne II, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 245. For 
the Court to later find that the case is sufficiently atypical 
to warrant an upward departure is enigmatic. We believe 
that the Court's later decision can be reconciled on the 
theory that it thought the case was mechanically similar 
enough to a typical smuggling case for it to fall within the 
smuggling guidelines, but was so much more offensive than 
most smuggling cases that an upward departure was 
warranted. 
 
At all events, the District Court decided that the case was 
sufficiently atypical that it would depart upward from the 
base offense level. We must examine the bases for the 
District Court's departure under section 5K2.0 under an 
abuse of discretion standard. See Koon, 581 U.S. at 97-98. 
The dominant basis for the District Court's upward 
departure was its conviction that the defendants had 
threatened the national security of the United States. At the 
sentencing hearing, the District Court stated: 
 
       I find the position [that there was no threat to national 
       security or the safety of any member of the military] 
       laughable. . . . Maybe [there was no threat to national 
       security] on a strategic basis, but for the ships' crews, 
       the troops in place, for the pilots, it certainly did. I 
       think [the government's] position flies in the face of 
       logic and I can't and will not accept it. 
 
Sent. Tr. at 14. In its opinion, the Court wrote,"The actions 
of the Individual Defendant potentially could have 
compromised, and in the future may compromise, the 
operational safety of the military and/or the operational 
readiness and effectiveness of communications, weapons 
and radar systems." Electrodyne II, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 268. 
It repeated this theme several more times. See, e.g., id. at 
262-63, 269, 270. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Introductory Commentary to section 2T3.1 states, "This Subpart 
deals with violations of 18 U.S.C. SS 496, 541-545 . . . and is designed 
to 
address violations involving revenue collection or trade regulation." 
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Despite the Court's oft-expressed concern that the 
defendants' actions posed a current or future threat to 
national security, its reference to the fact that the 
defendants shared information with the Ukraine that was 
not generally known, and its determination that this harm 
was not adequately captured by the monetary duties 
evaded by the defendants, there is no support in the record 
for the District Court's concerns. In fact, the record is 
uniformly and explicitly to the contrary. The government 
stipulated that: (a) there were no defects in the products 
imported by the defendants; (b) no confidential information 
was disclosed to Russia or the Ukraine; and (c) the 
defendants' acts posed no threat to national security or the 
safety of the military. 
 
More importantly, the government consulted each 
affected government agency before it agreed to accept the 
defendants' plea agreements, all of which assented. In 
addition, the government conceded in its sentencing 
memorandum that the defendants had taken affirmative 
action to prevent classified material from being disclosed. It 
also noted that some of the components imported by the 
defendants represented a flow of technology into, rather 
than out of, the United States. In sum, the District Court 
clearly erred to the extent that it found that the defendants' 
conduct created a threat to national security and it abused 
its discretion in departing upward on the ground that the 
defendants' actions threatened national security, since 
there is no support in the record for that conclusion. 
 
Nor was the District Court correct in using the presence 
of fraud as a reason to find the instant case atypical. The 
Court stated, "The focus and intent of the conduct 
underlying the crimes . . . were to criminally and 
fraudulently deviate from the contract provisions entered 
into with the United States Government . . . ." Electrodyne 
II, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 268. Conceiving of the smuggling as 
a way to further that fraud, the Court treated the fraud as 
something that made the defendants' smuggling case 
atypical. 
 
But this use of fraud is problematic. Smuggling by 
definition involves some element of fraud, and often occurs 
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to further fraud. The statute to which Lander pled guilty, 
18 U.S.C. S 542, states: 
 
       Whoever enters or introduces . . . into the commerce of 
       the United States any imported merchandise by means 
       of any fraudulent or false invoice, declaration . . . or by 
       means of any false statement . . . or by means of any 
       false or fraudulent practice . . . shall befined for each 
       offense under this title or imprisoned not more than 
       two years, or both. 
 
Id. Likewise, 18 U.S.C. S 545, to which Nathan pled guilty, 
states: 
 
       Whoever knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud 
       the United States . . . passes . . . any false, forged, or 
       fraudulent invoice . . . or [w]hoever fraudulently or 
       knowingly imports or brings into the United States, any 
       merchandise contrary to law . . . [s]hall be fined under 
       this title . . . . 
 
Id. A number of courts have noted that "the intent to 
defraud element of that statute should be construed as 
meaning intent to avoid and defeat the United States 
customs laws . . . rather than the narrower construction 
`intent to deprive the United States of revenue.' " See United 
States v. Robinson, 147 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1249 (1999); see also United States v. 
Borello, 766 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1985). Given that fraud is 
a critical part of the crime of smuggling, the mere fact that 
Nathan and Lander engaged in fraud as part of their 
smuggling violation does not render the smuggling atypical. 
 
Third, the District Court's upward departure was in part 
based on the defendants' violations of the AECA and the 
ITAR, violations that the Court found had been established 
by a preponderance of the evidence. See Electrodyne II, 28 
F. Supp. 2d at 269-70. However, as with fraud, the fact 
that the defendants' smuggling scheme also violated the 
AECA does not render their smuggling atypical. The AECA 
provides that "no defense articles or defense services . . . 
may be exported or imported without a license for such 
export or import . . . ." 22 U.S.C.S 2778(b)(2). The 
smuggling offenses to which Nathan and Lander pled guilty 
included this self-same conduct: knowingly and willfully 
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bringing certain merchandise into the United States 
contrary to law or introducing such merchandise into the 
commerce of the United States by means of a false or 
fraudulent practice. A violation of the AECA is arguably the 
archetypal smuggling offense. 
 
To the extent that there is anything about a violation of 
the AECA that makes such act an atypical smuggling 
offense, it is the fact that the AECA applies only to defense 
articles and services, to which national security concerns 
may attach. However, as discussed supra, any violations of 
national security in this case are chimerical. Therefore, the 
District Court abused its discretion to the extent that it 
relied on the presence of an AECA violation to find this case 
to be an atypical smuggling case. 
 
Finally, the District Court stated that the defendants' 
violations of the Buy American Act created additional harm 
that was not accounted for under the smuggling guidelines, 
thereby rendering the case atypical. See Electrodyne II, 28 
F. Supp. 2d at 270. The Court reasoned that Congress 
enacted the BAA to protect American labor and industry, 
that the defendants received an unfair commercial 
advantage by using cheaper manufacturers abroad, and 
that they profited financially from this advantage. The BAA 
is a civil statute, and the penalty for its violation is simply 
that a contractor shall not be awarded such contracts for 
three years after the violation is detected. See 41 U.S.C. 
S 10b. This facet of the sentencing decision appears to be 
only a small factor in the upward departure, given the 
Court's emphasis on the threat to national security, as well 
as fraud. At all events, to the extent that the BAA, standing 
alone, would be a ground for upward departure, it could 
not begin to support one of the magnitude applied here. 
 
Because the District Court improperly determined that 
national security concerns, fraud, and an AECA violation 
rendered this case an atypical smuggling case, we will 
vacate Nathan's and Lander's sentences under the 
smuggling guidelines and remand for further sentencing 
proceedings. The District Court may consider on remand 
whether their violations of the BAA caused harm to "society 
or protected industries" to an extent not captured by the 
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smuggling guidelines and, if so, whether this factor justifies 
an upward departure. 
 
C. Abuse of Position of Trust 
 
In determining that Nathan should receive a thirty-month 
sentence, the District Court concluded that Nathan had 
abused a position of trust under U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3 and, in 
accordance with that section, added two points to his total 
offense level. The Court opined that a double-counting 
problem would arise if it enhanced Nathan's section 2F1.1 
sentence based on abuse of a position of trust, but 
concluded that it was appropriate to enhance his section 
2T3.1 sentence for that factor. See Electrodyne II, 28 F. 
Supp. 2d at 260 n.80. Under section 3B1.3, the court must 
find (i) that the defendant was in a position of trust; and (ii) 
that he abused the position of trust in a manner that 
significantly facilitated the crime. See United States v. 
Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 412 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Nathan argues that he and the government should be 
treated merely as arm's length parties to a contract, and 
thus that he held no specific position of trust. He points 
out that the government assigned Electrodyne a quality 
assurance representative, who was to monitor Electrodyne's 
compliance with its government contracts. He also submits 
that if he held such a position of trust, that position did not 
facilitate the offenses here. The Court found significant 
facilitation based on the fact that Nathan was able to 
provide plans to Russia and the Ukraine for the 
components in question, but Nathan reminds us that those 
plans were public. And to the extent that the Court found 
facilitation based on Nathan's order to his employees that 
they conceal foreign markings, he contends that this 
offense was included in the "role in the offense" adjustment 
and that to consider it here would be double-counting. 
 
The government responds that the quality assurance 
representative was not assigned to oversee the contracts in 
question here. It also notes that Nathan's position allowed 
him to cover his tracks by directing employees to cover over 
foreign markings, and it contends that the District Court's 
finding on this point does not constitute double-counting 
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because the two different enhancements serve different 
sentencing goals: the aggravating role targets those whose 
conduct uses others to create more extensive harm, while 
the abuse of trust role targets those defendants who abuse 
their own positions. The government argues that we can 
affirm on the ground that Nathan's abuse of trust consisted 
of instructing his employees to cover foreign markings, and 
that we need not address whether Nathan abused his trust 
by transferring military data. 
 
We review de novo whether Nathan occupied a position of 
trust, and we review for clear error whether he used his 
position of trust to significantly facilitate the offense. See id. 
 
1. Existence of a Position of Trust 
 
In deciding whether a defendant holds a position of trust, 
a court must consider: 
 
       (1) whether the position allows the defendant to 
       commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the degree of 
       authority which the position vests in defendant vis-a- 
       vis the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there 
       has been reliance on the integrity of the person 
       occupying the position. 
 
United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1192 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Application Note 1 to section 3B1.3 states: 
 
       "Public or private trust" refers to a position of public or 
       private trust characterized by professional or 
       managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary 
       judgment that is ordinarily given considerable 
       deference). Persons holding such positions ordinarily 
       are subject to significantly less supervision than 
       employees whose responsibilities are primarily non- 
       discretionary in nature. 
 
S 3B1.3 application note 1. The Court found that Nathan's 
position allowed him to commit hard-to-detect crimes, since 
he was able to breach contracts without interference from 
superiors and was able to conceal those breaches through 
instructions to subordinates. (Though it also found that the 
government had relied on Nathan's integrity in revealing 
military information to him, this finding has no potency in 
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light of the fact that the information was already in the 
public domain.) The Court took note of the fact that Nathan 
submitted to the government an agreement acknowledging 
all of his responsibilities under United States export control 
laws and stating that he would not provide access to critical 
military data to persons other than Electrodyne's employees 
without Department of Defense consent. 
 
We have frequently determined that individuals who held 
high positions in their companies had positions of trust. 
For example, in Sokolow, we concluded that the defendant, 
as president and owner of his company, held a position of 
trust because he "was able to commit difficult-to-detect 
wrongs, as he had sole control over [the company's] 
accounts without oversight or supervision." Sokolow, 91 
F.3d at 413. We also noted that he had the authority to 
withdraw his victims' funds from his company and that 
such authority was necessary to complete the offense. See 
id. Nathan similarly had the authority to determine how his 
company would fulfill its contracts, which authority was 
critical to the success of his fraud. 
 
In United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1998), 
petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3758 (U.S. June 4, 1999) 
(No. 98-1957), we held that the defendant, who held a 
fiduciary position "as president and sole director of the . . . 
organizations" and who possessed "absolute control over 
the organizations," id. at 195, held a position of trust. The 
defendant created a phony board of directors, invented 
benefactors, and used the contributions for his own 
businesses. The court concluded that his victims--donors 
who were told that their money would be used for 
charitable purposes--trusted him and that his position 
enabled him to abuse that trust. See id. at 196. Like 
Bennett, Nathan held the highest position in the company, 
managed to conceal the breaches of contract forfive years, 
and owned a controlling block of stock. 
 
In analyzing whether a defendant held a position of trust 
in a contracting situation, courts have given weight to 
whether the victim reposed additional trust in the 
defendant by ceding its ability to confirm compliance with 
the contract, thus relying more heavily on the honesty of 
the defendant than an ordinary party to a contract would. 
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In a government contract case, United States v. Glymph, 96 
F.3d 722 (4th Cir. 1996), the Fourth Circuit concluded that 
a defense contractor who was allowed to certify his own 
compliance with his contract with the Department of 
Defense ("DoD") deserved an abuse of position of trust 
enhancement. The defendant, who was convicted of 
knowingly supplying to the DoD parts that did not conform 
to the agency's specifications, owned a company that was 
approved to participate in the DoD's "Alternate Release 
Procedure." This procedure allowed the company to ship 
parts without prior inspection by a government quality 
assurance representative so long as Glymph certified that 
each shipment had passed the required tests and 
conformed to the specifications. Though Glymph argued 
that he was merely an arm's length contractor with the 
government, the court held that in light of the self- 
certification procedure and the difficulty in detecting the 
fraud, he held a position of trust. 
 
Likewise, in United States v. Velez, 168 F.3d 1137 (9th 
Cir. 1999), the defendant, who operated a private 
immigration consulting firm, helped aliens file applications 
with the INS. He also directed a group that was a"qualified 
designated entity" (QDE), which meant that it had been 
given statutory authority to assist aliens in preparing 
legalization applications. Over three years, Velez submitted 
six thousand applications to the INS, many of which 
contained false information. At some points in time, the INS 
was only accepting applications from QDEs. The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Velez 
held a position of trust because of his special status with 
the INS as a director of a QDE and because his false 
documents could not be discovered as a matter of routine. 
See id. at 1139. It also affirmed that he had used his 
position to facilitate the offense, since he used his status to 
attract clients and to expedite the filing process at a time 
when only QDEs could file applications. 
 
Velez is a more clear-cut case than the present one, since 
Velez had statutory authorization (comparable to an 
oligopoly) that entitled him to benefits--and 
responsibilities--other entities did not have. However, like 
Velez, Nathan had a formal understanding with the 
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government that he would perform certain services in a 
certain way, and it was difficult for the government to 
monitor compliance with that understanding. See also 
United States v. Sherman, 160 F.3d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(holding that doctor who committed insurance fraud 
abused a position of trust because the victim-insurer used 
an honor system and costs to insurer of double-checking 
doctor's submissions would be prohibitively high). 
 
Much like the defendants in Glymph, Velez, and 
Sherman, Nathan, as president of the company, was in a 
unique position to make decisions for the company and to 
decide how Electrodyne would fill the government 
contracts. Since no one else--neither the government nor 
anyone at Electrodyne--was supervising his acts, he held a 
position that allowed him to commit wrongs, and that 
permitted him to make those wrongs harder to detect by 
requiring subordinates to mark over foreign labels and add 
"Made in the U.S.A." labels. Importantly, the government 
did not appoint a quality assurance representative to 
monitor the contracts at issue here, diverging from what 
appears to be its regular practice; thus, the government 
vested a significant degree of authority in Nathan. Finally, 
the government relied on Nathan's integrity not only in 
opting to contract with him (as the head of Electrodyne), 
but also in deciding not to assign an enforcement 
representative to ensure that he was complying with his 
contracts. Applying this court's abuse of position of trust 
jurisprudence, which is captured in the tripartite test set 
forth in Pardo, we conclude that the District Court correctly 
determined that the government was a victim within the 
meaning of Sokolow and that accordingly Nathan held a 
position of trust vis-a-vis the government.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In another government contracting case, United States v. Broderson, 
67 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 1995), the Second Circuit concluded that the 
defendant, who was an executive at Grumman, did not hold a position 
of trust. Grumman and NASA had contracted for Grumman to buy a 
supercomputer and lease it to the government; NASA was to pay fees 
based on the interest rate Grumman was paying to its bank. Broderson, 
a vice president of business operations, lied about the rate, charging the 
government a higher rate than Grumman was paying. This lie violated 
statutes requiring truth in contracting with the government. 
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2. Abuse of Position of Trust 
 
Since we conclude that Nathan held a position of trust, 
we must determine whether the evidence supports the 
conclusion that he used that position of trust to 
significantly facilitate his crimes. The District Court 
concluded that he abused his position because he revealed 
technical plans that had been entrusted to him. As 
discussed above, none of the evidence suggests that Nathan 
revealed confidential information. The Court also found, 
however, that his position allowed him to instruct his 
employees to paint over marks that identified the goods as 
made in Russia and the Ukraine and to re-mark the items 
as made in the United States. We review this finding of fact 
for clear error. See United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 
1250 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
In United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 
1993), we stated, "To abuse a position of trust, a defendant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The court decided that, though Broderson had discretion, the 
discretion was entrusted to him by his company, not by the victim 
agency. See id. at 456 (stating that "whatever `trust' NASA placed in 
Broderson was based strictly on the explicit commands of" the two 
relevant statutes he breached). In addition, the court was concerned that 
the government's theory might cause anyone who, by statute, must 
make accurate reports to the government (including taxpayers) to be 
subject to S 3B1.3. Finally, the court found that any abuse of trust that 
may have occurred was subsumed in the underlying base offense. See id. 
The court declined to hold that Broderson held a position of trust. 
 
We believe that Broderson is distinguishable both from Glymph and 
from the instant case. In Glymph, the DoD specifically delegated its 
inspection responsibilities to Glymph when it allowed him to certify his 
own compliance with his contract. In Nathan's case, the government 
essentially relied on Nathan to certify compliance with his contract, 
since 
it did not or could not appoint an inspector to comply with the particular 
set of contracts at issue in this case. In Broderson, the government 
simply trusted the defendant in the same way that parties to a contract 
trust each other to comply with the terms thereof. The additional 
certification responsibilities in Glymph, and the added level of trust by 
the government in deciding not to install an inspector to watch over 
Nathan's particular contracts, render those cases worthy of an abuse of 
trust enhancement. 
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must, by definition, have taken criminal advantage of a 
trust relationship between himself and his victim." Id. at 
1112. In Sokolow, we found such abuse where the 
defendant's role as president facilitated the commission of 
the money laundering offenses, and by virtue of his 
position, he was free to spend the money as he wished. See 
Sokolow, 91 F.3d at 413. The Sherman court readily 
concluded that "by virtue of the discretion given to 
Sherman [a doctor] in his position of trust," he was able to 
submit medical charges with no supervision, and he 
abused his position of trust when he submitted bills to the 
insurance company for services never provided and created 
fraudulent progress notes to support the fraudulent bills. 
See Sherman, 160 F.3d at 970. In a similar vein, in United 
States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992), we 
stated: 
 
       Lieberman stresses that he was only one of 40 vice 
       presidents of the bank, that he merely transferred the 
       funds from one account to another, and that the 
       detection of missing funds occurred in a routine 
       examination. We believe, to the contrary, that the 
       apparent ease with which Lieberman was able to effect 
       the crime over a four-year period shows the nexus 
       between the position of trust which he held and the 
       commission and concealment of the embezzlement. 
 
Id. at 993. 
 
The District Court did not clearly err in concluding that 
Nathan had abused his position of trust, since Nathan (i) 
was able to order his employees to help him cover up the 
telltale signs that his products were not being made in the 
United States; (ii) could instruct the Ukrainian and Russian 
companies not to label their products; and (iii) was 




We will reverse the District Court's decision to apply the 
fraud guidelines to Nathan and Lander. We also will vacate 
its alternative sentence based on the smuggling guidelines. 
However, we will remand for the District Court to 
resentence Nathan and Lander under the smuggling 
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guidelines, cautioning that violations of the BAA cannot 
merit an upward departure of the magnitude previously 
imposed. We will affirm to the extent that the District Court 
concluded that Nathan abused a position of trust. We 
dispose in the margin of Lander's appeal of the District 
Court's refusal to grant a departure based on his alleged 
status as a refugee who fled oppression and religious 
persecution in the Soviet Union, finding the argument 




The District Court calculated that Electrodyne's conduct 
caused a loss of $369,105.70. "Loss" as defined in the 
Guidelines represents the loss to the victims before 
restitution takes place, and is used to set a fine 
corresponding to the monetary harm caused by the 
defendants' conduct. The Court imposed a $500,000fine, 
which was within the Guideline range for losses of that 
magnitude, after finding that Electrodyne had the ability to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. As an initial matter, we must determine whether the District Court 
recognized its discretion to depart on this ground and declined to do so, 
or whether it concluded that it was legally precluded from departing. In 
the letter opinion, which the Court stated would control in cases of 
conflict with oral statements on the record, the Court discussed Lander's 
argument that his refugee status was not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Guidelines. The Court considered United 
States v. Vue, 865 F. Supp. 1353, 1359-60 (D. Neb. 1994), in which the 
sentencing court granted a departure to defendants convicted of 
smuggling a large amount of heroin based on the fact that they were 
refugees from Laos who had been persecuted in their home country for 
spreading democratic ideals. The Vue court reasoned, inter alia, that the 
defendants were not voluntarily governed by American law but were 
forced here because they fought our enemies. The District Court rejected 
the "reasoning and rationale" of Vue. Electrodyne II, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 
274 n.102. Rather, the Court found, Lander lives here and must be 
governed by our law. While the written opinion is arguably unclear as to 
the basis of its rejection of Lander's argument, it is supplemented by the 
sentencing hearing, during which the Court concluded that it had the 
legal authority to depart on the requested ground. Because the Court 
recognized its discretion but declined to exercise it, we lack 
jurisdiction 
over Lander's appeal on this point, see United States v. McQuilkin, 97 
F.3d 723, 729 (3d Cir. 1996), and to that extent it is dismissed. 
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pay such a fine. Our review of the District Court's findings 
of fact is for clear error. See United States v. Figueroa, 105 
F.3d 874, 876 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1248 (1997). 
 
A. The Loss Calculation 
 
Loss must be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 253 
(3d Cir. 1998). Application Note 9 (formerly Note 8) to 
section 2F1.1 states, however, that a loss need not be 
determined with precision, but can be a reasonable 
estimate. Here, where Electrodyne pled guilty to unlawfully 
exporting defense-related items and to making false 
statements, we think that its conduct should be treated as 
loss from fraud rather than loss from theft. In general, the 
loss from fraud is the financial loss actually suffered by the 
victim, or the loss that the criminal intended the victim to 
suffer if that is greater. See United States v. Maurello, 76 
F.3d 1304, 1309 (3d Cir. 1996).7 Because of the nature of 
the crime, which involved manufacturing fully functional 
parts, albeit in foreign countries, it is difficult to see what 
the monetary loss was, though both Electrodyne and the 
government use the restitution amount as a starting point.8 
Because Electrodyne agrees that some version of the 
restitution amount is the touchstone for the loss 
calculation, we direct our attention to that figure. 
 
The District Court found that Electrodyne stipulated to a 
$369,105.70 loss by stipulating to that amount in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The offender's gain is an alternative estimate that, according to the 
Guidelines, ordinarily understates loss. The PSI attempted to calculate 
Electrodyne's gain from the fraud, but concluded that it was impossible 
because the foreign components were just part of the overall assemblies 
that Electrodyne contracted with the government to deliver. 
 
8. Nathan and Lander argue that Electrodyne's stipulation on restitution 
did not mean that they themselves had stipulated to an amount of loss 
attributable to their conduct. Because we have concluded that the 
District Court should not have used the fraud guidelines, and therefore 
that the amount of loss should not be used to set the individual 
defendants' threshold offense levels, and because it appears that 
Electrodyne has assumed responsibility for any fine, we need not reach 
this issue. 
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restitution. However, because the restitution agreement 
contained various provisions, including in-kind transfers, it 
does not have an obvious face value. Electrodyne offers a 
loss calculation of $189,255.65, calculated by eliminating 
two items that the District Court and the Probation Office 
considered part of the restitution, on the ground that those 
two items did not reflect any actual or intended loss. The 
government acceded to Electrodyne's calculation in the 
District Court, though it argues before us that the Court 
did not clearly err in finding otherwise. We turn to the 
specific items whose valuation Electrodyne contests. 
 
1. The Air Force Contract 
 
The first contested item is the District Court's inclusion 
of $139,200 in the loss calculation, which represented 
Electrodyne's claim against the Air Force for a canceled 
contract. Electrodyne represents that this claim arose from 
a contract pursuant to which Electrodyne had to provide 
the Air Force with pin diode switches. During the pendency 
of the criminal investigation, the Air Force canceled the 
contract, which was one of Electrodyne's two contracts with 
the Air Force, on the grounds of delay. Electrodynefiled an 
administrative appeal, arguing that the contract had been 
canceled for the convenience of the Air Force. The parties 
reached a tentative settlement that Electrodyne would fulfill 
the contract and be paid $139,200 if Electrodyne was not 
convicted. When Electrodyne pled guilty, that settlement 
became void and the contract was canceled. 
 
The District Court found that the full amount of the 
$139,200 settlement was part of the "loss" to the Air Force. 
Therefore, the District Court calculated a total loss to the 
Air Force of $309,860, which also included $170,660 
relating to investigation and reprocurement costs for two 
contracts: the pin diode contract that was the subject of the 
settlement agreement and a separate contract for phase 
shifters. Electrodyne submits that, as a legal matter, the 
District Court's finding was in error. Our review of what 
constitutes "loss" is plenary and requires us to look for 
actual or intended harm to the victim. See Evans, 155 F.3d 
at 252. 
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The government argues that the $139,200 would have 
been Electrodyne's but for the plea agreement, and that the 
money would have been fraudulently acquired. However, 
the issue is not Electrodyne's potential total gain but the 
Air Force's actual or intended loss, if any, stemming from 
the criminal conduct. We have repeatedly emphasized that 
the amount of loss in a fraud case, unlike that in a theft 
case, often depends on the actual value received by the 
defrauded victim. See United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 
825 (3d Cir. 1995). Thus, when a defendant obtains a 
secured loan by means of fraudulent representations, the 
amount of loss is the difference between what the victim 
paid and the value of the security, because only that 
amount was actually lost. See United States v. Kopp, 951 
F.2d 521, 528-31 (3d Cir. 1991). In a fraudulent 
procurement case, the principles enunciated in Dickler and 
Kopp require us to offset the contract price by the actual 
value of the components provided in order to determine the 
amount of loss. See United States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 
555, 558 (7th Cir. 1991) (following this procedure in a 
fraudulent procurement case). 
 
In short, the face value of the contract does not reflect a 
reliable loss figure because Electrodyne was prepared to 
provide the components to the Air Force, and the value of 
those components must be offset against the amount the 
Air Force agreed to pay. This is true whether we speak of 
actual or intended loss. The government's argument ignores 
the value that the Air Force would have received for its 
money if the settlement had proceeded. That is, if the 
parties had carried out the agreement, the Air Force would 
have received pin diode switches that, for all this record 
shows, were worth $139,200. Because the loss to the 
government would not have been the full settlement 
amount, we cannot charge Electrodyne with the full 
amount as intended loss. 
 
More importantly, the government does not address the 
argument that the harm suffered by the Air Force was 
reflected in the $170,660 already attributed to 
Electrodyne's conduct. The crucial consideration here is 
that the District Court included the loss attributable to 
investigation and reprocurement relating to the pin diode 
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switches in its calculation of $170,660 due to the Air Force, 
independent of the $139,200 in dispute here. See 
Electrodyne II, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 255 & n.67. Thus, the 
difference between the value that would have been received 
by the Air Force and the materials Electrodyne was 
supposed to have provided has already been taken into 
account in the $170,660 loss calculation, which included 
the costs to the Air Force of getting the components from 
another source. 
 
We find that the settlement amount of $139,200 
duplicates the $170,660 for reprocurement and 
investigation, regardless of whether actual or intended loss 
is considered. The Air Force only suffered one loss relating 
to the pin diode switches, and the District Court double- 
counted that loss when it included both the canceled 
settlement and the reprocurement. We conclude that the 
Court erred when it treated this element of the restitution 
agreement as having value over and above the $170,660 for 
reprocurement of the items covered by the canceled 
settlement agreement. 
 
2. The Four Converters for NASA 
 
The District Court adopted the PSI's calculation that the 
four converters (a type of electronic component) 
contemplated in Electrodyne's restitution agreement had a 
value of $57,245.70, the cost of buying four new 
converters. The restitution agreement provided that 
Electrodyne would provide NASA with either (1) $14,595.65 
and three functioning converters, or (2) $42,650.05 and one 
functioning converter. The Probation Office apparently 
added the two dollar amounts together to come up with a 
total value, presumably on the theory that $14,595.65 was 
the value of one converter and $42,650.05 was the value of 
three, although $42,650.05 is not three times $14,595.65. 
Electrodyne does not challenge the inclusion of the 
converters' value in the loss calculation as such; rather, it 
disputes the valuation of particular converters. Thus, we 
need not address how the converters became part of the 
loss initially. 
 
The parties agree that two of the converters were already 
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in NASA's possession.9 They were damaged during the 
criminal investigation when government investigators 
opened them to look for foreign-manufactured components. 
Electrodyne argues that the restitution agreement 
contemplated that Electrodyne would fulfill part of its 
obligation by repairing those two converters, which it did at 
a cost of $2000. Electrodyne also provided NASA with a 
sample converter already in stock; it represents that the 
cost of that converter was "de minimis." Therefore, 
Electrodyne argues, the appropriate value of the particular 
four converters involved in this case is $14,595.65 (one 
converter) plus $2000 (repairs to two converters) plus zero 
(the fourth, sample converter), because this reflects the cost 
of restitution to Electrodyne. 
 
The government again responds that Electrodyne 
obtained the underlying contract through fraud by 
promising American-made components for the contract 
price and thus can be charged with the full contract price. 
This ignores the distinction in our caselaw between fraud 
and theft; NASA's gains have to be counted against the 
loss. 
 
We are persuaded by Electrodyne's argument about the 
repairs, but not by its argument about the sample 
converter. NASA had two converters that were damaged by 
Electrodyne's criminal conduct.10 As part of its restitution, 
Electrodyne repaired the harm for $2000. It seems logical 
that the proper measure of harm is the cost of repairs when 
that was all that was required, and not the full cost of the 
converters. See United States v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 865, 869 
(9th Cir. 1996) (charging the defendant with the cost of 
repairs when the result of her activity was damage, not 
destruction). Indirect support for this proposition is 
provided by Maurello, supra, in which we held that 
customers who were satisfied by the services of a defendant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The government points out that the restitution agreement said that 
Electrodyne would "provide" converters, but it concedes that two of the 
converters were in NASA's possession at the time of the agreement. 
 
10. We consider the damage caused by the investigation as included in 
the harm of Electrodyne's crime, because detection of the fraud required 
physical inspection of the components. 
 
                                36 
  
who fraudulently represented that he could practice law did 
not suffer "losses." Though the defendant's actions risked 
harm to them, if that harm did not materialize he could not 
be assessed with a "loss." Similarly, if the harm that 
materialized was a need for repairs and not a need to 
replace the entire machine, then the repairs should serve 
as the measure of the loss. The government does not 
dispute that the repairs were worth approximately $2000. 
 
When it comes to the sample converter, though, 
Electrodyne is mistaking its costs (which may well be de 
minimis) with the harm inflicted on NASA. If NASA was 
deprived of a converter by Electrodyne's criminal conduct, 
then it was harmed by the value of one converter, which is 
apparently worth about $14,000 to a buyer. It was not clear 
error to value the converter at approximately $14,000, 
reflecting its market value, even if it was not worth as 
much to Electrodyne, the manufacturer. 
 
Basing our calculation of loss on actual harm, it appears 
from the record that NASA was harmed by being deprived 
of two converters and by needing repairs to two others. 
Therefore, the total amount associated with the NASA 
converters would be approximately $30,000, the value of 




We conclude that the Air Force contract and the full 
prices of two converters were improperly included in the 
loss calculation; hence vacatur and remand is necessary. 
The full price of a third converter was, however, properly 
included. Our rough calculation, derived from Electrodyne's 
plea agreement, is as follows: 
 
       Stipulated restitution to Air Force      $170,660.00 
       Stipulated restitution to Naval 
       Research Laboratory                         2,000.00 
       Value of one converter                     14,595.65 
       Approximate value of sample 
       converter                                  14,000.00 
       Repair of two converters for NASA           2,000.00 
       Total Approximate Loss                   $203,255.65  
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(The first three items have values that are not here in 
dispute.) This recalculation affects the Guideline range for 
Electrodyne's fine. On remand, the District Court may 
clarify its finding on the value of one converter to set the 
exact fine. 
 




Electrodyne argues that it is unable to pay a $500,000 
fine.11 As a result of its plea, Electrodyne was suspended 
from new government contracts and lost its export 
privileges, which constituted 80% of its business before the 
plea. At the time of the plea, Electrodyne had $1.9 million 
in back orders from the government and anticipated no 
profit on those contracts. The PSI stated that Electrodyne 
would cease to exist once it fulfilled its obligation under 
those remaining contracts. Electrodyne sold its assets to 
another company, AdComm; contracted out most of the 
remaining contract work; and fired all but five employees. 
 
The District Court calculated Electrodyne's ability to pay 
as follows: 
$25,219.48        First Union Account 
$162,000          Promissory note from AdComm 
$31,486           Security deposit from AdComm 
$340,000          Navy contract 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Electrodyne also contends that the government is estopped from 
arguing that Electrodyne can pay more than $140,000, because the plea 
agreement included an agreement on the appropriatefine to be 
presented to the District Court. This argument is without merit. 
Electrodyne had the benefit of its bargain: The government diligently 
argued the position set forth in the plea agreement to the District Court, 
which on its own initiative rejected the government's position. The plea 
agreement allowed the government to take any position on appeal. The 
appeal provision of the plea agreement contemplated exactly this sort of 
situation, in which a sentencing court rejects the government's position 
but the government chooses to support the court on appeal. See United 
States v. Griswold, 57 F.3d 291, 298-99 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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$132,000         "Equitable adjustment" requested on 




Guideline section 5E1.2 requires that a fine be waived 
when an individual defendant is unable to pay. By contrast, 
section 8C3.3(b), the corresponding provision in the 
corporate Sentencing Guidelines, does not require waiver or 
reduction. At all events, as we recognized in Electrodyne I, 
the fine must not be unrealistic. The sentencing court must 
take account of the corporate defendant's financial 
resources, putting the burden on the defendant to produce 
relevant materials, before setting a fine that may consume 
all of the defendant's assets. See Electrodyne I, 147 F.3d at 
255. 
 
Currently, Electrodyne states, it has only those physical 
assets that are being used to fulfill the remaining contracts. 
There is also a $162,000 balance on the promissory note 
AdComm gave for Electrodyne's inventory. Moreover, 
AdComm gave Electrodyne a security deposit of $31,486. 
Finally, Electrodyne submitted a statement showing that it 
had $1200 in its bank account as of May 31, 1998. It 
represents that these various sources of income will allow 
it to pay the $140,000 fine contemplated in its plea 
agreement, but no more. 
 
2. The Remaining Contracts 
 
In Electrodyne I, we remanded for findings on 
Electrodyne's ability to pay. By the time of resentencing, in 
August 1998, two of Electrodyne's remaining five contracts 
had been completed. The PSI had initially stated that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We admit to some confusion here. The contract amount, according to 
the facts recited by the District Court, was $173,000. The amount used 
by the District Court, $132,000, was apparently the upward adjustment 
in the contract amount requested by Electrodyne but not yet granted at 
the time of sentencing. We are unsure why the Court used the 
adjustment number and not $173,000 or the combined total of 
$305,000. Although the parties do not discuss this issue, it might be 
useful for the Court to clarify its finding on remand, particularly if the 
contract amount has been resolved. 
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contracts were break-even projects, and no further evidence 
on their profitability was presented. On one of the three 
outstanding contracts, the Defense Supply Center has 
declared Electrodyne in default. Electrodyne is appealing 
that declaration, and if it wins it will owe the government 
nothing, while if it loses it will owe $49,458. Thus, there are 
two remaining executory contracts, one with the Defense 
Supply Center and another with the Navy. 
 
On the contract with the Defense Supply Center, 
Electrodyne submitted an affidavit stating that it was 
negotiating for a $132,000 increase in the contract price 
(originally $173,000). On the contract with the Navy, the 
contract amount was $340,000, and Electrodyne had 
delivered $88,000 worth of product and had received a 
$100,000 progress payment. The affidavit does not state 
whether these contracts are break-even; Electrodyne argues 
that it was entitled to rely on the PSI, which stated that the 
five contracts remaining at the time of the PSI were break- 
even. However, the District Court found that, because 
Electrodyne failed to specify the expenses incurred in 
connection with the manufacture of the components under 
the two remaining contracts, it would deem the full amount 
of the projected sales--$472,000--available to pay a fine. 
But see supra note 12 (noting that this might not be the full 
amount of the projected sales). Electrodyne argues that the 
Court ignored the obvious fact that manufacturing has 
costs, and that it made its findings in the face of the 
information in the PSI. 
 
The government suggests that, consistent with our 
opinion in Electrodyne I, Electrodyne's failure to provide all 
the financial information requested by the Court upon 
remand insulates the Court's conclusions from attack. The 
government submits that the Court did not clearly err in 
deciding that the entire income stream from the remaining 
contracts would be available to pay a fine. It suggests that 
the materials for the contract might already have been 
manufactured and merely awaiting delivery, and so there 
might be no remaining manufacturing costs. 
 
Electrodyne responds that it did not culpably fail to 
provide information. It points out that, after remand in 
Electrodyne I, the District Court ordered Electrodyne to 
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produce a number of documents relating to past expenses 
and profits, but did not order Electrodyne to set forth 
expenses projected for the remaining contracts. Moreover, 
Electrodyne produced a good deal of the requestedfinancial 
information, and it explained its inability to produce the 
missing information. It had never been subject to an audit 
according to generally accepted accounting principles. It 
submitted an affidavit from an accountant that a 
retroactive audit would not provide any reliable information 
because inventory could no longer be verified, that a full 
audit could cost up to $12,000 per year, and that because 
of the cost it was not standard for a business Electrodyne's 
size to undergo audits unless an investor or lender required 
them. It also submitted an affidavit from Sol Schneiderman, 
a consultant who was by mid-1998 the only person working 
full-time for Electrodyne, identifying the years for which 
Electrodyne did not have complete records and noting the 
current status of the remaining contracts. The District 
Court amended its order, relieving Electrodyne of the 
burden of producing documents that did not, according to 
Schneiderman, exist. 
 
Electrodyne was able to provide tax returns from 1990 to 
1997 and unaudited financial statements and balance 
sheets for 1990-1991, 1994-1997, and through May 31, 
1998. The balance sheets showed sales costs between 65% 
(1995) and 82% (1994) of gross sales and operating 
expenses between 17% (1994) and 34% (1995 & 1996) of 
gross sales. In every year but 1990, therefore, Electrodyne's 
balance sheets show net operating pretax income of under 
1% of gross sales. Electrodyne argues that the District 
Court ignored this record in concluding that Electrodyne 
would have no expenses for the remaining contracts. It 
asserts that if Electrodyne's net profit on the executory 
contracts averaged what it had been between 1990 and 
1997, it would make $3304 in profit from the two 
contracts, a sum consistent with the prediction that the 
remaining contracts would be break-even propositions. 
 
We have been unable to find guidance in the extant 
caselaw on determination of ability to pay. We find it 
difficult to believe that Electrodyne had no expenses when 
fulfilling its remaining contracts, but we are also 
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unconvinced that Electrodyne provided sufficient 
information. As Electrodyne changed from a going concern 
to a dying business, it is not obvious that past expenses are 
an appropriate guide; a one- or five-employee operation that 
is contracting out most of its work doubtless runs 
differently than a business that employs nearlyfifty 
employees. Therefore, Electrodyne's proposed measure of 
profit from the remaining contracts seems as unlikely to be 
accurate as the conclusion that the contract amounts 
represent pure profit. 
 
However, Electrodyne may have been legitimately 
surprised by the District Court's conclusion that the two 
remaining contracts represented pure profit, given that the 
PSI stated otherwise and that the government never argued 
the issue. Because the only record evidence on the 
remaining contracts comes from the PSI, which labeled 
them break-even, we conclude that the District Court erred 
in deeming all contract payments available to pay afine. 
We emphasize that, were there other evidence in the record 
to the contrary, the District Court could have accepted it. 
On remand, we think that Electrodyne should be required 
to offer proof of its expenses in carrying out the remaining 
parts of the contracts. See Evans, 155 F.3d at 252 n.8 
(sentencing court should inquire about the defendant's 
financial prospects). The burden of proving expenses is 
properly on Electrodyne, and the District Court may 
conclude that money not accounted for is available to pay 
a fine. See Electrodyne I, 147 F.3d at 254; United States v. 
Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1211-12 (3d Cir. 1994) (court may sua 
sponte recalculate a defendant's net worth in determining 
his ability to pay if the PSI recommends a fine; the burden 
is on the defendant to prove inability to pay a larger fine).13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Electrodyne also argues that the District Court clearly erred in 
concluding that Electrodyne's May 1998 checking account balance of 
$25,219.48 was available in August. Schneiderman's June 26, 1998 
affidavit stated that Electrodyne had $1200 in the bank, while a First 
Union bank statement dated June 30, 1998 listed $419.57 in the 
account. The government does not contest this point. On remand, the 
District Court should put together as accurate a picture of Electrodyne's 
financial position as possible, although we reiterate that it may properly 
place the burden on Electrodyne to account for funds. 
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3. Payment Schedule 
 
Electrodyne further argues that it should not have to pay 
the total fine immediately. Guideline section 8C3.2(b) 
requires organizations to pay immediately unless the court 
finds that they are financially unable to do so or that 
immediate payment imposes an undue burden. Full 
payment should be required at the earliest possible date or 
in installments, within five years. See U.S.S.G. S 8C3.2(b). 
In Electrodyne I, we remanded for findings on the time 
within which Electrodyne's fine should be paid; while, on 
remand, the District Court ordered immediate payment, it 
did not specifically address the question whether all the 
assets it had identified were immediately available to pay a 
fine. 
 
The District Court counted $162,000 on AdComm's 
promissory note as available funds. However, that money is 
paid monthly in $1566.35 increments, scheduled to end in 
February 2002. Similarly, the Court considered the 
amounts due on the executory contracts immediately 
available. However, the government had, at the time of 
briefing, made only a $100,000 progress payment on one of 
the two contracts. An unaudited balance sheet from May 
31, 1998, showed that Electrodyne's liabilities exceeded its 
assets by $32,156 on that date. The government does not 
address the issue of a payment schedule. In view of the 
foregoing, we are constrained to conclude that the District 
Court abused its discretion in finding the total amounts 
due from AdComm and from the remaining government 
contracts immediately available, because it is 
incontrovertible that Electrodyne does not yet have that 
money. Again, the judgment must be set aside, and on 
remand the District Court should determine a proper 
schedule of payments. 
 
IV. Reassignment on Remand 
 
An impartial judge is a basic due process requirement. 
We have on occasion exercised our supervisory power to 
reassign judges on remand in order to preserve the reality 
and appearance of impartiality. See Alexander v. Primerica 
Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 1993); Haines v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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The defendants argue that the District Court appears to 
have made up its mind about important elements of the 
case without having any information to back up its 
suppositions. It is clear that the District Court repeatedly, 
and contrary to the record, stated that the defendants' 
conduct had endangered the safety of American troops, 
arguably relying on its own deeply held patriotic views in 
derogation of the clear record and skewing the sentencing 
decision. Therefore, the defendants submit, the judge gave 
an appearance of partiality and prejudgment sufficient to 
justify reassignment to a different judge on remand. The 
government responds that there is no evidence that the 
District Court would defy our mandate. It did indeed cut 
Electrodyne's fine in half, from $1 million to $500,000, after 
the first remand, and it adhered to our mandate while 
exercising its discretion to resolve a number of contested 
issues (though not all) against the defendants. 
 
The matters left for resolution in the wake of this opinion 
are few and relatively circumscribed. We conclude that the 
drastic remedy of reassignment is not necessary here. 
Moreover, the case remains a complex one that would 
weigh heavily on a sentencing judge unfamiliar with the 
facts. We have every confidence that the able and 





For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be reversed, and the cases will be remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. In one respect, the appeal is dismissed. See supra note 6 and 
accompanying text. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting: 
 
I concur in part and dissent in part from Chief Judge 
Becker's comprehensive opinion, because I would affirm the 
District Court's upward departure decision. 
 
This is a difficult case, factually and legally. It is made 
perhaps more difficult by several "disconnects" along the 
way. Principal among these are: first, the government's 
willingness to accept guilty pleas to violations of statutes 
punishing false entry documents and false markings on 
goods, when the admitted conduct consisted of a well- 
orchestrated scheme to produce, in foreign countries, goods 
for military use that were, by law and by contract, to be 
produced in the United States, in violation of several federal 
statutes; and second, the lack of "fit" of the crime charged 
and the conduct conceded with the specified sentencing 
guideline, which applies primarily to crimes involving 
revenue collection and trade regulation.15  
 
I fault these mismatches for the District Court's need to 
resort to an upward departure. Unlike the majority, I read 
the District Court's upward departure as having been based 
not so much on the threat to the military that the majority 
references, but rather, on entirely proper grounds. These 
are: (1) that the offense was outside the heartland duty 
evasion case because the falsification and absence of 
markings was done not merely to evade duties, but to 
conceal an extensive criminal scheme that violated several 
other laws; and (2) to account for the uncharged fraudulent 
conduct (i.e., dismissed counts) clearly conceded by 
defendant at the guilty plea colloquy, both permissible 
grounds for upward departure under our holding in United 
States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856 (3d Cir. 1997). 16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The majority characterizes the applicable guideline as a "smuggling" 
guideline and it is in the sense that it applies to improper introduction 
of goods into the country, but it is addressed primarily at duty evasion. 
The guideline itself notes that importing of contraband or restricted 
goods is covered by other guideline provisions. 
 
16. It is ironic that while a sentencing court could not start with an 
applicable guideline offense level unless the defendant actually 
stipulated to the conduct, the sentencing court can clearly arrive at that 
level in the end by departing upward, based upon relevant conduct 
admitted in connection with the plea but uncharged (or dismissed). In 
United States v. Baird, we held that result to be quite permissible. 
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This sentencing would have proceeded differently had 
there been a more suitable starting point than a duty 
evasion guideline. The absence of a more specific guideline 
as to the type of crime committed -- which is, by its nature, 
not your run-of-the-mill duty evasion or, even, fraud, 
offense -- was, I believe, at the heart of the dilemma facing 
the sentencing judge. The District Court did the best it 
could with the hand it was dealt by the Sentencing 
Commission. The majority concludes that the sentencing 
judge abused his discretion. I submit that he reached an 
understandable -- and, I believe, appropriate-- result. 
 
I agree with the thorough analysis of my colleague with 
respect to all of the issues, save this one. I would affirm the 
upward departure determination of the District Court and 
therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of the 
opinion. 
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